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Abstract
 
In this article the author will investigate the extent to which Bhikhu Parekh believes that
a person’s cultural/religious background must be preserved and whether, by implication,
religious schooling is justified by his theory. His discussion will explore—by inference and
implication—whether Parekh’s carefully crafted multiculturalism, enriched and illuminated
by numerous practical insights, is socially tenable. The author will also consider whether,
by extension, it is justifiable, on his line of reasoning, to cultivate cultural and religious
understandings among one’s own children. Finally, the author will contend that Parekh,
notwithstanding his cautious, even-handed approach, commits several important errors,
including conflating the culture of the parents with that of the children and insisting that
cultural and religious persons ought to be allowed to defend their views in the public square
on religious grounds.
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The only choice open to any society today is to manage and build on the
creative potential of its diversity.
—Parekh, 
 
Rethinking Multiculturalism
 
, p. 171
Bhikhu Parekh, a member of the British House of Lords and a leading interpreter
of political theory, defends the objective good of cultural diversity and embraces
a tolerance of difference, critical self-consciousness, empathic understanding and
intellectual openness. He argues that individuals have to be understood in both a
particular as well as a universal sense. The particular sense is cultural (and this
includes religion)
 
1
 
 and Parekh is convinced that each of us, while not 
 
determined
 
by culture, is nevertheless 
 
embedded
 
 in culture. To put a finer point on it, culture
is constitutive of who we are, for cultures not only locate us according to particular
contexts, they affect us deeply and irrevocably to the point of structuring and
shaping our very personalities and providing the content of our identities. Con-
versely, the universal sense in which human beings must be understood appeals to
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a code of human rights that can be derived from intercultural exchange and which
seeks to build consensus through mutual respect and understanding. To emphasize
one aspect to the exclusion of the other is to court a myopic understanding of the
human person.
Parekh does not justify all human behavior in terms of each individual’s culture
or value system. Nevertheless, Parekh seeks to challenge liberalism, broadly con-
ceived, and its singular stress on cultivating individual autonomy, rationality, and
its instrumental view of culture. As an alternative to liberalism, he endorses
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, to quote Parekh at some length,
… deflates the absolutist pretensions of liberalism and requires it to
acknowledge its contingent historical and cultural roots. Since no culture
exhausts the full range of human possibilities, multiculturalism also requires
liberalism to become self-critical and to engage in an open-minded dialogue
with other doctrines and cultures. It rejects the liberal claim to enjoy the
monopoly of moral good and to be the final arbiter of all moral values, its
crude and tendentious division of all ways of life and thought into liberal
and nonliberal, and its persistent tendency to avoid dialogue with other
cultures by viewing them as nothing more than minority cultures whom it
would ‘grant’ such rights as it unilaterally determines. (Parekh, 1999, p. 74)
Parekh is wholeheartedly multiculturalist inasmuch as he aims to affirm the iden-
tities that persons inherit; but he possesses familiar liberal traits as well, for we hear
him call upon individuals to critically evaluate their views, engage the perspectives
of others, and be open to revising one’s opinions. Yet it would be more accurate to
call Parekh a communitarian, though one could also label him a multicultural
liberal. Ever mindful of the reality of pluralism, Parekh attempts to build on the
creative potential of cultural diversity in a new and interesting way.
In this paper, my discussion will investigate the extent to which Parekh believes
that a person’s cultural/religious background must be preserved and whether, by
implication, religious schooling is justified by his theory. My discussion will
explore—by inference and implication—whether Parekh’s carefully crafted multi-
culturalism, enriched and illuminated by numerous practical insights, is socially
tenable. I will also consider whether, by extension, it is justifiable, on his line of
reasoning, to cultivate cultural and religious understandings among one’s own
children. I will contend that Parekh, notwithstanding his cautious, even-handed
approach, commits three important errors of increasing severity:
• He insists that cultural and religious persons ought to be allowed to defend their
views in the public square on religious grounds.
• He exaggerates the degree to which persons are incapable of transcending their
culturally embedded values.
• He conflates the culture of the parents with that of the children.
By insisting that cultural and religious minorities should be given the right to blend
their private and public lives in the political deliberative process, Parekh wishes to
 Embedded Identities and Dialogic Consensus
 
497
 
© 2005 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
resist the liberal habit of abstracting away from one’s most cherished beliefs in
order to arrive at a reasonable consensus 
 
vis-à-vis
 
 the public good. Though Parekh
makes a strong case for incorporating religious arguments into the political deliber-
ative process, I will disagree with Parekh and argue that the separation of public
and private concerns is both politically expedient and wise. When I say that he
exaggerates the sense in which persons are incapable of transcending their cultur-
ally embedded values, I will show that Parekh draws a very tight link between a
person’s cultural background and the person that she becomes or is capable of
becoming.
While Parekh acknowledges that persons may—and indeed ought to—question
their cultural practices, he does not accept the view that autonomy divorced from
one’s particular history, geography and family context is possible. ‘Autonomy,’ he
writes, ‘is difficult to define and impossible to measure or demonstrate, and any
attempt to violate equality in its name opens the door to all manner of specious
reasoning …’ (Parekh, 2000, p. 253). I assert that Parekh conflates the culture of
the parents with the culture of the children, and makes no fine distinction between
the cultural pursuits of the parents and those that are passed down—one could say,
 
imposed—
 
on one’s children. This point is particularly important when we come to
the question of religious schooling and the right of parents to sequester their
children—even in the privacy of their own homes—for comprehensive cultural and
religious education. Ultimately, I will argue, Parekh’s theory provides a powerful
rationale for advocates of parents’ rights to educate their children as they see fit.
If, the argument may run, parents are culturally embedded and need to have an
adequate understanding of their cultural and/or religious identities in order to
flourish, then they are justified in sending their child(ren) to comprehensive (e.g.,
Jewish, Islamic, Sikh, Evangelical Protestant) religious schools that aim to provide
children with the ethnic/religious (ethnicity being more relevant in some traditions
than others) content specific to the parents’ worldview.
Before I elaborate each of these points, I will first sketch Parekh’s main ideas.
 
Cultural Embeddedness
 
Parekh engages his reader in a sophisticated and enlightening discussion on the
differences between society and culture, as well as the differences between culture
and religion. Culture, for Parekh, is:
… a historically created system of meaning and significance [ … ] a system
of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of human beings
understand, regulate and structure their individual and collective lives. It is a
way of both understanding and organizing human life. (Parekh, 2000, p. 143)
And elsewhere, elucidating the role of culture in our lives, he adds,
… our culture gives coherence to our lives, gives us the resources to make
sense of the world, stabilizes our personality, and so on. Its values and
ideals inspire us, act as our moral compass, and guide us through life; its
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arts, rituals, songs, stories and literature fill us with joy and add colour
and beauty to our lives; and its moral and spiritual wisdom comforts and
helps us cope with the inevitable tragedies of life. (ibid., p. 159)
Parekh recognizes that cultures are far from static and develop over time; he affirms
that cultures must adapt and change if they are to avoid dying out. Moreover, he
is mindful of the fact that no culture is undifferentiated or univocal but contains a
variety of interpretive strains within it. This means that no one’s cultural identity is
ever settled or fixed for all time, for new situations and knowledge (e.g., technology,
conquests, and natural calamities) necessitate an ongoing reevaluation of culture.
 
2
 
In articulating his understanding of culture, Parekh is careful to avoid two
extremes. On the one hand, he tries to avoid a 
 
monist
 
 tendency, which attempts to
reduce cultures to their trans-cultural essence. Drawing upon the work of Isaiah
Berlin, Parekh contends that moral monism:
… either argues that one value is the highest and others merely a means
to or conditions of it, or more plausibly and commonly that although all
values are equally important or some more than others, there is only one
best or truly rational way to combine them. For the monist evil, like
error, can take many forms, but the good, like truth, is inherently singular
or uniform in nature. (ibid., p. 16)
Parekh charges that monists frequently assume the superiority of certain cultures
and thus conclude that it is acceptable to impose specific cultural values on others.
 
3
 
But Parekh also tries to avoid the 
 
culturalist
 
 tendency. Culturalists make the oppo-
site mistake, Parekh continues, by maintaining that, since cultures have a right to
exist and be protected, there is no room for criticism or judgement towards cul-
tures for the values, beliefs and practices that they embody. According to Parekh,
both of these tendencies must be denied ontological privilege. ‘No single value
trumps all others,’ he writes, ‘and their relative importance can only be decided in
the light of the social and cultural context and the likely consequences’ (ibid., p. 320).
He attempts to occupy a mediating space between these two realities.
Here Parekh comes very close to the views of Will Kymlicka. Both Parekh and
Kymlicka emphatically deny liberals the right to impose their views on illiberal
national minorities and both encourage dialogue as a way to reach respectful com-
promises.
 
4
 
 Both Parekh and Kymlicka also defend culture 
 
not
 
 in itself but insofar
as it (a) firms up individual or group identities and bestows a sense of belonging,
and (b) enhances personal agency and development, situating individuals in a
framework within which one can make moral choices (Kymlicka, 1995, 83).
 
5
 
 All of
these elements mean that culture is central to a person’s well-being. Nevertheless,
Kymlicka makes his position, 
 
pace
 
 Parekh, very explicit concerning his objection to
communitarianism. Defending the liberal position, he writes,
If we wish to defend individual freedom of conscience, and not just group
tolerance, we must reject the communitarian idea that people’s ends are
fixed and beyond rational revision. We must endorse the traditional liberal
belief in personal autonomy. (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 163)
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Parekh objects to Kymlicka’s emphasis on the centrality of autonomy and his
insistence that a person’s views should (or even can) be open to revision.
 
6
 
 As I
explained earlier, Parekh has a fluid understanding of culture, but this does not
prevent him from overplaying the sense in which we are 
 
necessarily
 
 shaped by our
cultures. Having a ‘deep bond’ to our cultures, as Kymlicka would have it, is far
different from the conclusion that Parekh draws from it.
 
Culture, Cosmopolitanism and Coercion
 
When Parekh describes individuals who are ‘culturally footloose,’ as he puts it, and
appear to move effortlessly between different cultural milieus owing to an absence
of loyalty to any one particular culture, he treats this as an undesirable deviation.
Eclectic individuals who exchange and borrow from a variety of cultural repositories
are likely to lead shallow and fragile lives, he claims. Cosmopolitans, he says,
lack ‘historical depth’ and a sure foundation in a particular culture, are unlikely to
have the resources necessary to negotiate their way in life. He believes that cosmo-
politans are bereft of the moral compass that a disciplined life in one culture can
provide. Parekh strips cosmopolitans of cultural identity altogether when he says,
for instance, that their lives become ‘a culture of quotations, a babble of discordant
voices, and not a culture in any meaningful sense of the term’. Even though he
recognizes that cultural boundaries must be stretched and tested, Parekh is con-
vinced that individuals must find their bearings inside of structured boundaries,
the absence of which provides no point of reference for making meaningful decisions.
Parekh is also aware of the coercive role that culture may play in the lives of
individuals, particularly the way that it ‘institutionalizes, exercises and distributes
power’. Cultural values are often arrived at and acquire their dominant position
‘through a prolonged process of indoctrination and coercion, and continue to be
actively or passively contested by marginalized groups’ (Parekh, 2000, p. 268).
Nevertheless, he is convinced that individuals are resourceful enough to obtain
critical distance from their cultural bearings. Here Parekh takes a step back from
his previous assertiveness concerning the constitutive role of culture and argues that
no one is so pliant as to be subject to cultural restraints without a capacity to criticize,
question and refuse the pressure to conform unthinkingly. To love one’s culture, he
says, is to wish it well, and ‘that involves criticizing and removing its blemishes’.
But this ability of individuals to be self-critical and aware of the coercive ele-
ments of one’s culture co-exists with his resolve that each person ought to feel
 
loyalty
 
 to his or her culture ‘because of its profound contribution to our lives and
also perhaps because of its universal value’ (ibid., p. 160). Parekh concedes that
one’s cultural loyalty may be overridden if one’s judgement of it is overwhelmingly
negative, but this seems a passing notion to which he gives no serious thought.
Indeed, loyalty to the valuable aspects of one’s culture is paramount to the point
of it being a 
 
duty.
 
 Listen to Parekh:
We also have a duty to preserve and pass on to succeeding generations
what we think valuable in it, to defend it against its perverse
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misrepresentations [ … ] and to protect it against wanton attempts to
destroy or discard it. (ibid.)
Parekh also claims that one’s relationship to a cultural community is qualitatively
different from one’s relationship to voluntary associations. Voluntary associations
are elective, he alleges, while cultural communities are inherited. ‘Unlike voluntary
associations we are deeply shaped by our cultural communities and derive our
values and ideals from them,’ he writes. A cultural community:
… performs a role in human life that a voluntary association cannot. It
gives its members a sense of rootedness, existential stability, and feeling
of belonging to an ongoing community of ancient and misty origins, and
ease of communication. And it does all this 
 
only because
 
 it is not a
conscious human creation and one’s membership [to] it is neither a
matter of choice nor can [it] be easily terminated. (ibid., p. 162)
The apparent inconsistencies in Parekh’s notion of cultural rootedness, one that
requires clear boundaries with historical depth while also admitting to a cross
fertilization and lack of fixity, is an interesting 
 
via media,
 
 one that avoids the
trappings of an essentialist notion of culture while embracing some aspects of
cosmopolitanism. Parekh admits that isolated cultures are ill equipped to provide
the resources necessary for critical engagement with difference and, owing to their
homogeneous structure, often lead to feelings of powerlessness or confusion. Still,
he does not hesitate to label cosmopolitanism as little more than the stuff of one’s
‘intellectual environment’. He does not give a convincing reason why a person
might begin to order her life 
 
not
 
 according to her ‘collective culture’ but, rather,
according to thoughts and habits inspired by the broad and sundry range of influ-
ences that Parekh relegates to the bewildering category of ‘an unincorporated alien
resource’. He does not explain exactly 
 
why
 
 one should be dismissive of a hybrid
identity informed by an amalgam of influences but only argues that cultural com-
munities create a dialectical space from within which we come to engage the world
around us.
 
An Argument for Diversity
 
In order to appreciate the emphasis that Parekh places on cultural diversity, it is
necessary to elaborate his argument defending diversity as an objective good.
Diversity is no incidental feature of cultures or persons who inhabit them but
constitutes a range of important goods that are desirable to members of a culture
and non-members alike. Traditionally there have been those who have argued for
the good of diversity for reasons such as (a) it expands the available range of
options as well as the concomitant freedom of choice; (b) diversity is an unavoid-
able outcome of a person’s ‘right to culture’; (c) diversity provides the aesthetic
benefit of a more rich and interesting cultural space from which one can reflect
and create; and (d) diversity creates a healthy competitive atmosphere that prevents
any one view from illegitimately dominating others.
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Parekh shows his appreciation for each of these reasons but ultimately finds them
either shallow, vague, or insufficient. In their place, he provides his own reasons
for valuing diversity 
 
per se
 
:
Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a
limited range of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others.
However rich it might be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in
human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Different
cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other’s
horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human
fulfillment. 
 
The value of other cultures is independent of whether or not they
are options for us. Indeed they are often valuable precisely because they are not.
 
Its inassimilable otherness challenges us intellectually and morally,
stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognize the limits of our
categories of thought. (ibid., p. 167, emphasis added)
Parekh links this awareness of cultural otherness to human freedom and stresses
that, without alternative ways of imagining one’s life, there would inevitably be a
kind of determined confinement to one’s inherited culture with no recourse to
other ways of organizing and understanding human existence. Because diversity
provides us with the means of self-knowledge and self-criticism, it is an objective
good.
Parekh anticipates objections from those who claim to be content with their
homogeneous cultures. Happy and satisfied with the network of relations and cul-
tural norms of their own community, some will argue that they see no intrinsic
benefit to diversity, especially when no culture contains the fullness of truth. Hence
to engage in intercultural dialogue is to cast doubt on the value of following one’s
already fully valued way of life. Parekh acknowledges the strengths of a homogene-
ous society but nevertheless points out that ‘[E]ven when his culture is reasonably
rich, such a dialogue [with other cultures] deepens his insight into it and helps him
identify, nurture and exploit its resources better’ (ibid., p. 171). Parekh steadfastly
affirms the objective good of encountering diversity given the tendency of homo-
genized communities to ‘become closed, intolerant, averse to change, claustrophic
and oppressive, and to discourage differences [and] dissent’ (ibid., p. 170). He
insists that openness to diversity can benefit even relatively homogeneous cultures
(though he would have to admit that benefiting from diversity is not guaranteed;
nor should it be assumed that ‘open cultures’ naturally result in a manifest display
of historical or conceptual depth necessary to sustain civic coherence).
 
Liberalism and Dialogical Consensus
 
Parekh knows that whatever the faults of liberalism, it remains the most congenial
theory to cultural diversity. He is also aware that his liberal opposition to closed
communities is as strong as it is precisely because he knows that tolerance, critical
self-consciousness and intellectual openness are important moral virtues to cultiv-
ate. Parekh also affirms central liberal values when he says that treasuring cultural
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diversity is not synonymous with preserving ‘prevailing forms’ of domination or
oppression, particularly when the cultural expression of domination or oppression
does not command the allegiance of all members of a particular culture. His
qualifying remarks are very timely here:
… all existing cultures need radical changes because of their deep-seated
sexist, racist and other biases which cause considerable suffering to large
sections of their members. Every age also has its distinct needs, experiences
and aspirations, and cultures must be adapted to these if they are to
conduce to human flourishing. (ibid., p. 169)
Therefore, insofar as Parekh argues for respect for culture, he does so only to the
extent that the lives of its members are strengthened and enhanced. For example,
he contends that, no matter what the custom, ‘children should not be subjected to
irreversible harm and women should be treated equally with men’ (ibid., p. 294).
Appealing to universal values as a basis for moral claims is valid and appropriate
in many contexts and should be encouraged, he notes, but universal values cannot
simply 
 
replace
 
 local values; they must be interwoven and interpreted in light of local
values and norms in order to merit the attention and respect they rightly deserve.
This is because individuals are ‘not abstract moral beings,’ Parekh insists, but are
culturally constituted in particular ways. Parekh notes that a culture has its values
to begin with:
… because society cherishes, endeavors to live by, and judges its
members’ behavior in terms of them. They are 
 
public
 
 because they are
embodied in its constitutional, legal and civic institutions and practices
and regulate the public conduct of its citizens. And the values are 
 
operative
 
because they are not abstract ideals but are generally observed and
constitute a lived social and moral reality. (ibid., p. 269, emphasis added)
That is to say, values lose much of their meaning if left to abstract devices
dissociated from ‘the procedures and practices in which they are embodied’. How-
ever, to reiterate, these values are not static but change according to societal
circumstances and members’ self-understanding. And, of course, there will always
be those who dissent from the publicly recognized view. Parekh is correct to stress
that, even in liberal democracies, there are many citizens who do not privately
adhere to certain public virtues (e.g., equality, tolerance), but, owing to the moral
coercion of public policy and sentiment, such citizens are constrained to behave in
certain ways. This will play out differently for different people; for some, they will
come to internalize the more tolerant attitudes that society comes to embrace while
others will experience a separation between their public and private behavior.
Finding the resources to criticize cultures appropriately, Parekh insists, can
usually be done 
 
from the inside.
 
 The internal resources necessary to challenge the
prejudices within one’s culture are possible because cultures 
 
have no essence
 
 but
contain different strands of thought. In every cultural tradition, reformers have
engaged in a hermeneutical struggle by highlighting those elements that have
historically been marginalized or suppressed. Yet, because humans are incorrigibly
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prone to misjudgement, partiality and bias, authoritarian power structures fre-
quently remain in place that thwart any and all attempts to question misapplica-
tions of cultural norms from the inside. The resources needed to properly evaluate
cultures, then, must surpass the moral compass internal to cultural communities.
But liberal universal values, Parekh adds, must also be interpreted, adjusted and
local circumstances must be ‘related to the moral and cultural structure of the society
concerned; in short, contextualized if they are to carry conviction’ (ibid., p. 293).
Parekh issues a stern warning against the liberal tendency to judge cultures
according to a handful of criteria. Liberal values such as autonomy, rationality and
freedom are not reducible to a single standard unconnected to specific contexts.
Parekh avers that comparing whole cultures on a single scale is ‘logically incoher-
ent’ and that all cultures are in some sense incommensurable. He also declares that
universal values depend on local circumstances if they are to retain ‘their relevance,
meaning and effectiveness’. Parekh adduces many examples to demonstrate his
point, but none is more effective than the issue of headscarves for Muslim girls and
women. Many Muslim women, as a BBC report (September 29, 2003) from Egypt
recently indicated, regard their headscarves as a mechanism for freedom and
mobility. Ethnographers in Dearborn, Michigan, have also noted that:
The Arabic girl has different ways to express her Arabic culture. Instead of
a tattoo, her emblem is likely to be the ‘cover,’ the local name for the 
 
hijab.
 
It is as much a fashion statement as it is a religious one. Traditionally, the
 
hijab
 
 is supposed to be a display of modesty in one’s appearance.
However, in the hands of the Arabic female, it becomes something else.
 
7
 
Therefore, to see the headscarf 
 
merely
 
 as a sign of oppression is not only to lapse
into crude stereotypes but also to fail to appreciate the complex process of nego-
tiation and compromise that it entails. What is important to note here, then, is that
religious or cultural symbols cannot be defined and compared in the abstract. This
is, Parekh explains, both ‘because they rarely have exactly equivalent significance
and because they acquire different meanings in different contexts and historical
periods and might sometimes even cease to be religious in nature’.
 
8
 
Comparative Evaluation and Political Deliberation
 
Comparative evaluations as a way of appraising the moral value of certain cultural
practices must be weighed against certain basic values such as respect for persons,
personal choice, and basic human dignity. Yet even these basic values will be
culturally mediated, Parekh purports, and one must not equate their import with
some universal, context-free meaning. He explains his view this way:
… if a cultural community respects human worth and dignity, safeguards
basic human interests within the limits of its resources, poses no threat
to outsiders and enjoys the allegiance of most of its members, and thus
provides the basic conditions of the good life, it deserves to be respected
and left alone. (ibid., p. 177)
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There are reasons to be concerned here. For starters, Parekh does not define
‘human worth and dignity’ explicitly according to any recognizable standard
(though he does appeal to the UN Charter as a fine approximation). Also, phrases
such as ‘poses no threat to outsiders’ and ‘enjoys the allegiance of most of its
members’ give little consideration to the welfare of minority members of these
communities, including those who dissent from the majority view. Parekh acknow-
ledges structured inequalities within cultures but believes that intercultural dialogue
and reasoning, no matter how emotionally taxing, will provide the comparative
basis for compelling change where interlocutors disagree with the cultural practices
of others. He seems to believe that judgements of other cultures should be sympa-
thetic to the particular thought patterns that inhere in a culture and insists that
there can be no room for liberal unilateralism. This is because intercultural and
political dialogue rarely occur between equals owing to prevailing structural dis-
advantages and economic inequalities. But Parekh does not hesitate to add:
… if after careful consideration and listening to their defense we find their
choices perverse, outrageous or unacceptable, we have no duty to respect
and even a duty not to respect these choices. We separate the right and its
exercise, and do not allow our attitude to one to influence that to the
other. Their right does not forfeit our respect because it is exercised
badly, and our respect for it does not entail respect for its manner of
exercise. (ibid., p. 176)
Using several concrete examples, Parekh demonstrates through sound reasoning
how many controversial practices (e.g., female circumcision, 
 
sati
 
 or widow burning,
polygyny) are not sustainable practices in view of their violation of basic human
freedoms. For Parekh, respect for any culture will be based on how we assess its
content; in particular our respect will be contingent on the life that is either
provided for or denied to its members.
Political deliberation is the process whereby comparative intercultural evaluation
for public policy can be achieved. Parekh calls for ‘new institutional forums’ where
members of different cultural communities can meet and discuss differences in the
hope of arriving at a tentative consensus. Parekh criticizes both Rawls
 
9
 
 and
Habermas
 
10
 
 for making proposals that privilege rational deliberation cut off from
the ‘constitutive attachments’ that make us who we are.
 
11
 
 He consistently favors
an understanding of humans deeply colored by one’s ‘cultural and evocative asso-
ciations’, noting that seemingly neutral topics of discussion can play out very
differently for different groups owing to deep seated cultural assumptions, judge-
ments and fears.
The manner in which Parekh arrives at moral judgements does not privilege
either cultural or liberal principles. Instead, each situation calls for careful evalu-
ation according to the degree that particular cultural practices enable a community
to cohere and thrive, but also according to the degree that cultural practices
discriminate against particular members of the community. Parekh admits that the
process can be ‘most exasperating’ and is ‘necessarily messy,’ but he insists that
patience, sympathy and understanding are necessary to arrive at intercultural
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consensual agreements about morally acceptable cultural practice. Sometimes the
arguments will run analogically
 
,
 
 other times the basis will be universal values, and
still other times an appeal might be made to a society’s cultural or historical
identity.
 
12
 
 Even where we might find certain cultural practices to be acceptable or
unacceptable 
 
in themselves
 
, they must be weighed against other, equally important,
criteria including a culture’s history, ethos, and traditions of inequality or power.
 
The Difficulty of Equality
 
Earlier I showed that for Parekh there can be no privileging of the monist position
of universal values over the cultural. The opposite is of course equally true. Those
who locate their interests on the side of the multiculturalist frequently invite the
charge of relativist, while liberals stand accused of moral imperialism. But, liberals
protest, without universal norms of some kind there is likely to be all manner of
abuse toward weaker individuals in societies that privilege their own, self-contained
body of values. Parekh agrees, but as I have shown, Parekh adamantly holds to the
view that universal values must be seen in light of local, cultural values and inter-
preted accordingly. To illuminate his point I will take the liberal value of equality.
The value of equality can be articulated at a variety of levels. It entails equality
of respect and rights, equality of opportunity, self-esteem, and self-worth, and
finally it involves equality of power, well-being and the basic capacities required for
human flourishing. Sensitivity at each of these levels is important and, Parekh
points out, ‘[w]e can hardly be said to respect a person if we treat with contempt
or abstract away all that gives meaning to his life and makes him the kind of person
that he is’ (ibid., p. 240). This means situating a person within her cultural back-
ground and its thought forms, but more importantly it also involves seeing one’s
opportunities 
 
in relation to
 
 others who comprise the dominant group. For example,
while certain customs are defended based on a ‘religious requirement,’ many are
little more than cultural expectations and can be suitably reinterpreted to fit
different cultural and political norms.
 
13
 
 Other customs (e.g., narcotic use, abstention
from pork), however, are more central to the way in which a cultural or religious
group identifies itself. Equality, applied indiscriminately, will have different effects.
Equal treatment cannot mean 
 
identical
 
 treatment. To indiscriminately apply the
principle of equality will inevitably lead to injustice. Additional efforts are some-
times required in order to ensure that everyone is given an equal opportunity.
 
14
 
For example, many people with physical or mental disabilities require additional
assistance to attain the same (or, minimally, a higher) level of capability that others
attain without effort. Similarly, there are those whose religious requirements
necessitate special accommodation because to apply ‘equality’ across the board is
to discriminate against certain groups and not others. Some accommodations may
seem unreasonable and indeed, unfair. Certain cases (turbans for male Sikhs in the
place of crash helmets) seem on the face of it to be a foolish compromise of safety
sacrificed on the altar of cultural sensitivity.
 
15
 
 Others (sporting beards, yarmulkes,
traditional dress, time off work for Friday prayers, etc.) will have to be negotiated
in the intercultural space Parekh invites us to explore with respect, sensitivity and
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wisdom, recognizing that compromises will have to be made one way or another.
He writes,
When we take legitimate cultural differences into account, as we should,
equal treatment is likely to involve different or differential treatment,
raising the question as to how we can ensure that the latter does not
amount to discrimination or privilege. There is no easy answer to this.
(ibid., p. 261)
Parekh is well aware that additional rights and resources can arouse anger and
resentment among the majority group. Therefore, he insists that accommodations
be granted only when they can be justified.
 
Discussion
 
Toward the beginning of this paper, I stated that Parekh commits three important
errors. Having considered Parekh’s general philosophical theory, I want to address
each of these errors and proffer a few recommendations. (Here I must remind the
reader that religion and culture, for Parekh, are inextricably linked.) To the point
that religious persons should not be forced to segregate their private and public
lives in order to engage in the political deliberative process, I will say three things.
First, Parekh is right to ask us not to expect individuals to abstract away from their
most cherished beliefs; multitudes of political players have labored for the public
good according to the religious principles that inspire them. Parekh also makes an
interesting case for including religious justifications in the political deliberative
process; these include: (a) the idea that participating in a civic procedure ought to
include some knowledge and understanding of the religious views many citizens hold;
(b) the need to teach about religion in schools; and (c) learning about other ways
of thinking facilitate ‘a richer and [more] expansive conception of public reason’.
Nevertheless, it seems a serious mistake to extrapolate from the preceding points
that religious 
 
justifications
 
 for public goods ought to be allowed, or that defending
one’s views in a language common to the public square ‘discriminates against
religious persons and violates the principle of equal citizenship’ (ibid., p. 324).
Parekh reasons that religious arguments create no more difficulties than the garden
variety of secular arguments brandished for the deliberative process. I unreservedly
disagree. It is one thing to say that the state ought to exempt certain individuals
(e.g., Seventh-Day Adventists) from specific duties because they violate their reli-
gious integrity, or that the state ought to make certain provisions (e.g., military
chaplains) to accommodate personal beliefs. However, it is another matter to
equate the rights of freedom to follow one’s conscience with religious justification,
or to liken religion-inspired emancipatory movements with the grounds needed to
achieve shared political values. Finding the common ground among ‘reasonable
persons’
 
16
 
 upon which agreements can be made and values pursued is a necessary
goal; this is the positive side to dialogic consensus. However, I maintain that it is
also necessary and desirable to sidestep the divisions that are likely to accompany
exclusive claims to comprehensive religious truths.
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To illustrate how we might incorporate religious views into political deliberation,
Parekh offers us the example of the Catholic Church, its position on abortion, and
public policy. Parekh says that Catholics ought to be allowed to appeal to their
religious dogmas in arguing against the practice. Yet, Parekh also notes why
religious grounds for political justification depart from reasons that can appeal to
the sympathies of non-adherents of that religion. Parekh beckons us to take up the
criticisms of the Catholic Church on both internal and external grounds. His
internal reasons are not terribly convincing and show his cursory knowledge of
Catholic history and theology. His external arguments, however, are more com-
pelling. He writes that while the Church may be allowed the freedom to express
its views, it has no legal or moral right to use the machinery of the state to impose
its views on those who disagree with it, and that:
… liberals are equally justified in imposing on [the Catholic Church] their
own fundamental belief in the equality of the sexes … [or] we might
follow a different route and contend that since many communities do not
welcome children born out of wedlock or have no means to support them,
the Church must either provide a nationwide support system or refrain
from making irresponsible and impossible demands. We could [also]
reinforce the point by showing that unwanted children lack love, carry
emotional scars [and] that banning abortion damages human dignity as
much as and to an even greater degree than allowing it. (ibid., p. 326)
Parekh is ready to acknowledge the significant role that the Catholic Church can
play in ‘affirming an important value, nagging our consciences, [and] requiring us
to reflect publicly and critically on our moral practices’. Nevertheless, he amply
demonstrates why any religious counter arguments to this are doomed to failure,
for no amount of patristic, encyclical or biblical exegesis is able to stand up to public
scrutiny in this way. The reasons are obvious: justifications that rest on religious
dogma are 
 
inaccessible
 
 and 
 
untenable
 
 to those who do not share the convictions to
which they are attached. Parekh concedes the point but fails to see this as a reason
to refrain from engaging citizens according to religious beliefs.
 
17
 
 Parekh needs to
embrace more fully the manner in which liberalism accommodates a variety of ways
of defining the good life (though not allowing for 
 
all definitions) without making
explicit what those definitions must include.18 Autonomy is typically central to the
liberal’s concern, but as Eamonn Callan has argued, ‘Autonomy is not the high road
to all that is good nor is its absence a guarantee of evil’ (Callan, 1997a, p. 49). More
and more liberals are questioning the centrality of individual autonomy without
jettisoning the incomparable freedom liberalism allows. Callan has eloquently stated
that the objective of a sound liberal moral doctrine could not dictate the content
of the good life ‘in all its fine detail’. Liberals are averse to prescribing the particular
ends of cultures or individual lives but do insist on a particular ‘style or manner in which
we should conduct our lives’ (ibid., p. 18). If justice is to be procured, Callan writes,
A certain notion of reciprocity is the nerve of that virtue: the reasonable
citizen is disposed to propose fair terms of cooperation to others, to settle
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differences in mutually acceptable ways, and to abide by agreed terms of
cooperation so long as others are prepared to do likewise. Principles that
pass the test of reciprocity under pluralism must abstract from many of the
divisions that pluralism contains. (ibid., p. 175, emphasis added)
Enter now the second error that Parekh makes: he exaggerates the sense in which
we are unalterably culturally embedded. I readily concede that the desire to remain
affiliated to one’s inherited culture usually remains strong, but it is another matter
to insist that a person needs her culture to make meaningful decisions, or that one’s
autonomy is constrained within ‘flexible but determinate limits’. That one might be
so constrained is a matter for individual cases, but it is puzzling that Parekh, who
finds the absolutizing tendencies of liberalism distasteful, seems to absolutize
himself. Parekh needs to show us why it is that persons are unable or even dis-
inclined—albeit to varying degrees—to relinquish their cultural template in favor
of another (typically the freer one) in order to negotiate tough moral choices.19 The
point is not whether most people leave the cultures into which they were born, but
simply that some do, and many more move back and forth between two or more
cultural milieus. One sees this repeatedly in immigrant communities,20 and cultural
belonging is particularly problematic for parents who wrestle with intergenerational
conflict where ethnicity and religion do not resonate with their children. Parekh’s
theory leaves little room for those who simply do not identify with their inherited
culture and desire little if anything from it.21 Some individuals cannot exist, think,
act or relate to others independent of their inherited cultural context but Parekh
overstates his case when he extends this to everyone.
Further, to the point that the resources to criticize culture typically come from
the inside, we might ask Parekh whether the internal critical resources he mentions
can truly be summoned on pains of bodily harm, shunning, or death. In many
cultures, reformers are constrained to draw upon religious texts in order to chal-
lenge power structures. If the rights to interpret religious texts rest with the clergy
or its equivalent elite, prospects for authentic challenge are severely limited. Parekh
admits that ‘every culture is too multistranded, fluid and open-ended to have ‘fixed
terms’ in which to evaluate it,’ but this does little to console those who attempt to
challenge community leaders who claim the right to define cultural norms for all
members.
Parekh’s discussion of the ‘cosmopolitan’ is also somewhat disparaging. It is
disparaging because Parekh gives little recognition to the widespread hybrid iden-
tities of persons living in multicultural societies. Instead, we find him saying that
these persons ‘lack historical depth’ and the resources to make meaningful choices.
On this understanding, there is no recognition of the millions of individuals—
especially immigrants—whose cultural identities daily overlap between two or more
cultures. Parekh acknowledges that cultures ‘constantly encounter one another,’
challenge and borrow from one another widening their horizons and undergoing
big and small changes (Parekh, 2000, p. 220). Nevertheless, in the main his dis-
cussion of culture, reformulated throughout his text, suggests a rigidity unamen-
able to hybrid identities. Jeremy Waldron explains the implausibility of this position:
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Most human lives are not led within the confines of a particular culture
but are framed and formed both by the movements of people among
cultures and by the movements of culture among peoples. Indeed the
beginning of wisdom in multicultural education is the rejection of any
simple correlation along the lines of ‘one-person-one culture’. (Waldron,
2003, p. 26)
Ironically, Parekh’s defense of diversity as an objective good seems an implicit
endorsement of cosmopolitanism, and one has the feeling that his disdain for the
cosmopolitan targets a bogeyman, most probably the dilettante, rather than those
claiming more genuinely multi-cultural identities.
Parekh also seems unwilling to allow that the ‘particular habits of thought’ he
attributes to cultural community need not be internalized. This is because he does
not address the particular motives that accompany the ‘habits of thought and
feeling’ that often accompany one’s enculturation. Each of us, even the staunchest
defenders of our culture, has qualms with certain customs, norms, prejudices or
traits of temperament that hold sway over our respective communities. Each of us
may be socialized into a particular manière d’être, but it does not follow that we are
indelibly marked by it or even that we have internalized it. For many people, the
habits of thoughts and feeling are governed less by internalized cultural principles
and more by the logic of etiquette. Parekh is correct to say that each of us uncon-
sciously acquires from our cultural communities bodily gestures, inhibitions, effort-
less communication and a ‘body of sentiments and memories;’ I also agree with his
argument that well-being is enhanced on account of the traits within one’s inherited
community. However, it would be unwise to assume that these habits for many
people are anything more than expedient—albeit culturally delineated—behaviors
that facilitate familiar social intercourse. There is no doubt that one does share a
sense of common identity with others by virtue of a measure of sameness that
colors one’s experiences in culturally distinctive ways. Even so, this identification
may be very thin indeed. In societies where experiences are manifold, options
seemingly endless, and issues dauntingly complex, Parekh’s culturally circum-
scribed norms seem ill-equipped to grasp the manner in which millions of persons
define themselves and negotiate moral choices by relativising their cultural norms.
He also fails to distinguish between persons who choose to embrace or reject
cultural values and those who have these elements imposed upon them.
Yet for all that I have said, Parekh’s definition of culture is expansive enough to
test his previous claims. First, he concedes that one’s culture need not be defined
by the culture into which one is born; rather, one’s culture is ‘the one we live,
which has shaped us, and with which we identify’. Our lives are shaped and
organized by influences that extend beyond our family background; indeed, Parekh
writes that ‘an ethnic community might lose its traditional culture, as when it
migrates or abandons that culture in favour of another, [or] when it is freely
adopted by or imposed on outsiders’ (Parekh, 2000, p. 154). This will lead to a
cultural community based on the attributes of a ‘shared culture’. Furthermore, he
is aware that cultures are fluid and that their participants regularly connect with
510 Michael S. Merry
© 2005 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
other cultural communities through music, television, film and literature, not to
mention daily contact through commerce. So here, we have the broader definition
of culture that can satisfy the need of the cosmopolitan, but, given Parekh’s assess-
ment of the cosmopolitan, it is not at all clear how Parekh reconciles one with the
other.
Finally, to the third point that Parekh conflates the cultural interests of the
parents with those of the children, he assumes that children’s interests will be
identical to their parents’. So, on the question of the right to initiate one’s children
into a tradition through comprehensive religious schooling, Parekh gives parents
his unreserved approval on the grounds that these schools:
… instill a distinct set of moral and cultural sensibilities, increase the
available range of educational options, add to the variety of collective life
by producing citizens with different characters and perspectives on life,
respect the wishes of the parents, [and] prevent the state from acquiring the
monopoly of education and exercising total control over its content …’.
(ibid., p. 133, emphasis added)
In order to rein in the problems that many are prepared to associate with a com-
prehensive religious education (i.e., a withdrawal from the broader purposes of
citizenship), Parekh appeals to the vague requirements of a ‘minimum nationally
prescribed’ curriculum. Yet, this tactic will doubtless alienate non-liberal commu-
nities who stand inflexibly opposed to these aims. Too, any concern for cultivating
children’s capacity to question their parents’ culture or religion is simply not
addressed. Parekh would appear to have it both ways, but his proposals will satisfy
neither the liberal nor the multiculturalist. They will not satisfy the liberal because
Parekh concedes too much to culture, even allowing for wholesale indoctrination
of children. But neither will Parekh’s proposals satisfy non-liberals because they too
regard the openness of a liberal education as indoctrinatory, albeit in a relativist
sense.
What we can deduce from Parekh vis-à-vis children is that his views appear to
be congenial to parentalist liberals (though their liberalism has repeatedly been
questioned).22 Insofar as children have specific interests, these liberals (inter alia
Lomasky, Galston, Burtt) claim that they can only be interested in non-servility.23
These liberals resist the autonomy-promoting liberalism of others because of what
they consider to be potentially oppressive requirements. Ensuring non-servility
rather than autonomy also guarantees a certain amount of character-specific develop-
ment that a character-neutral autonomy cannot. In other words, refusing to
advance autonomy allows communities the space to cultivate other non-oppressive
goods (e.g., obedience, loyalty, specified gender roles) considered central to well-
being. (On the other hand, Callan points out that character-neutral autonomy will
not suffice to loosen the habits that have taken root long ago in an individual’s
psyche and may have resulted in one’s ‘vulnerability to abuse’; see Callan, 1997b,
p. 231.)
Parentalists view with considerable suspicion the push to make children auto-
nomous. All choices, they argue, are conditioned (though not determined) choices.
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Loren Lomasky is representative of this view. He resolutely believes in the obduracy
of human nature regardless of the totality of one’s environmental conditioning. He
writes,
… we all inherit ends from others and, contra the fervent champions of
autonomy, it is good that we do so. Were that not the case, we would find
our way barred to the formation of projects that essentially make the good
of another a component of one’s own good. (Lomasky, 1987, p. 184)
Parekh would sit well with Lomasky’s view, I think, for even when he decries
religious groups that seek to impose their views on others, refusing to accept their
equality and respect their integrity, he does not have children in mind. Parekh
would surely have something to say against unreasonable and intolerant views, but
he appears to support the idea that parents are simply entitled to pass down their
views to their children. Assuming that they are, it is doubtful whether Parekh
recognizes the need to represent not only the child who exists today but also, in
the words of Robert Noggle, the ‘largely unknown future adult whom that child
will become, and the moral community which she must join if she is to thrive and
flourish’ (Noggle, 2002, p. 115).
To the issue of religious schooling and the quandary it creates for potentially
conflicting parent/child interests, there have been a number of attempts to reconcile
liberal and communitarian/multicultural interests. Parekh has offered one of them,
viz., the minimum nationally prescribed curriculum. He is too strong a believer in
common citizenship to take leave of common schools and public institutions. Con-
cerning religious schooling he has also said that they potentially hinder common
and responsible citizenship ‘unless they share a common curriculum and a common
ethos, aim at broadly similar intellectual and moral virtues, and form part of a well-
thought out educational framework’ (Parekh, 1997, p. 527). Another approach has
been to accept that early education might involve religious schooling in order to
imbue children with cultural coherence before they engage with views outside of
their community.24 A number of liberals have attempted to build this bridge. Take
Meira Levinson:
… our conception of autonomy must incorporate a commitment to the
development and preservation of cultural coherence. Individuals must be
able to feel embedded within a culture or set of cultures, and to mediate
their choices via the norms and social forms constitutive of their
culture(s). (Levinson, 1999, p. 31, emphasis added)
Ultimately, however, the aim is to facilitate autonomy, a goal Levinson and other
liberals unabashedly promote to the consternation of non-liberal communities.
Liberals who favor diversity to a higher degree continually fall under the criticism
that they make precious little provision for a meaningful exit from communities
whose integrity they seek to defend. Parekh joins these liberals in seeking ways to
close the divide between communitarian and liberal concerns. Yet while his unique
contribution addresses the manner in which deliberation might take place—a col-
lection of skills Parekh has doubtless garnered from his years in political office—the
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outcome of his proposals do not inspire confidence in the exhausting effort one
must undertake.
Conclusion
Parekh grants that culture is not determinative of a person’s identity. However, as
I have tried to show in this paper, his insistence that we are culturally embedded
leads him to posit that we have a duty to preserve our culture. This also leads him
to reject cosmopolitanism and to opine that we need to have structured boundaries
in order to make meaningful decisions. It is not clear whether Parekh can sustain
the balance between, on the one hand, affirming the inherent good of diversity and
the cultural embeddedness of individuals, and on the other hand the need to
cultivate extensive sympathy with difference.
Of course Parekh is not alone in valuing diversity. While most liberals tend to
hold an instrumental view of culture, increasingly liberals have given a primacy of
place to cultural pluralism and have affirmed a variety of—even illiberal—ways of
pursuing one’s understanding of the good. These thinkers have been at pains to
defend themselves against the charge of insensitivity to the needs of weaker mem-
bers of cultures whose interests are not protected by the aims articulated by its
leaders. Liberals often parade autonomy, rationality and freedom as the preeminent
values to trump the ‘unreasonable’ demands of cultural communities. And, yet, it
is precisely here that Parekh enters the debate. He joins the chorus of folks who
hold liberals guilty of ‘unreasonableness’ insofar as they fail to provide reasons for
prizing one set of (liberal) values over another. Whether liberals have failed to
provide reasons for valuing these (but not only these) goods over the culturally
circumscribed goods that challenge them is not a theme I will pursue here, but
it is increasingly being addressed in the literature that facilitates the liberal-
communitarian debate.
I have argued that Parekh can be compared to Kymlicka, though they are differ-
ent in at least two important ways: Parekh is more reluctant than Kymlicka to
consider autonomy central to human well-being, and Parekh thinks revising one’s
views is unlikely to happen given the way culture so profoundly shapes all that we
do. Parekh’s strengths lie in his encouraging understanding through dialogue and
reciprocal gesture, and by insisting that liberals not prejudge illiberal cultural
norms prior to understanding the ways in which these cultures function and what
goods obtain therein. Parekh also evinces powerful arguments pointing to the mani-
fold ways in which individuals do not operate merely as free and rational agents
but contextually as persons with distinctive histories, experiences and prejudices.
Among his original contributions, Parekh demonstrates tenable reasons for taking
religious persons seriously on their own terms (and even making provisions for laws
that take account of communal libel).
Still, difficulties linger. We might ask Parekh: (1) in the process of fostering
sympathy and understanding through intercultural dialogue, what assurances will
there be that various cultures will loosen the reins on customs and traditions that
guide the operations and activities of their members and resist ‘dialogic consensus?’
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(2) If too much emphasis is placed on comparative evaluation, will there ever be
sufficient justification—satisfactory to all parties—necessary to implement policies
whose aims are to combat illiberal behaviors among minority groups? (3) Are we
able to have confidence that dialogical consensus will give us the tools necessary
to counter domestic abuses that pass for culture and are enshrined in religious
belief ? Parekh’s theory, for all of its sophistication, confuses things (see Parekh,
2000, pp. 146–47). If nothing else, there is reason to be concerned with his anthro-
pological habit of linking too intimately the relationship between culture and reli-
gion, particularly when religious justifications too easily subsume cultural claims.
Parekh is likely to respond that no assurances are available and risks will always
attend political deliberations where neither side retains the upper hand. Even so,
if persuasive argument is to be the tool of obtaining consensus, one can be sure
that many groups that do not value persuasive reason—let alone human rights—
will remain unmoved and obstinate to the values embraced by the majority. This is
because different cultural groups exercise the freedom to value and practice differ-
ent ideas of good, defined on their own terms. Because this is so, one has reason
to fear a one-sided accommodation process with those who want nothing to do
with the notions of equality, freedom, and autonomy as defined by liberalism.
Indeed, his promotion of diversity as an objective good is precisely the sort of
thing many illiberal communities will not dither to repudiate. These communities
are unlikely to be coaxed away from their singular aims of indoctrination and
insularity.
Let me be clear: I am not saying that liberalism ought to be imposed on all
people irrespective of their wishes. Nevertheless, insofar as illiberal cultural groups
are interested in sharing a social space respectfully with others, they are obliged
to abide by certain standards of conduct. For example, one cannot, as recently
happened in the Netherlands, call for the random killing of homosexuals simply
because someone’s personal belief system finds them repugnant.25 Illiberal groups
are free to disagree with the terms set by liberal democracies but arguments against
these terms must be made on publicly accessible grounds. Of course, groups may
exempt themselves from engaging others in the public sphere with reasons acces-
sible to others, but if they become unhappy with the manner in which state power
is used against them, they will have little recourse in protesting it.
To his credit, Parekh is very mindful of this. He firmly believes in the equality
of the sexes and seeks to avert ‘irreversible harm’ done to children. Yet, while he
offers several case studies, there is no clear procedure for making qualitative judge-
ments about certain cultural practices.26 In the end, equitable decisions will depend
on a host of factors possibly leading us to the conclusion that even some question-
able cultural practices need to be left alone. Furthermore, parental rights on
Parekh’s theory are left largely unchecked; this includes religious schooling for the
purposes of instilling the values of the parents, a practice which receives his vigor-
ous approval. While he supports a common curriculum that will strengthen civic
virtues, these aims are kept to a minimum. By conferring parents with the right to
educate their children as they see fit, Parekh ceases to apply his theory consistently
when it is likely to matter the most.
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Parekh is committed to universalism, albeit a very thin one, but it is not liberalism.
According to Tariq Modood,
Parekh is committed to [a] meta-ethical commitment to the cultural
diversity that constitutes humanity, an understanding of humanity that
eludes every culture but is glimpsed in the dialogue between cultures.
(Modood, 2001, p. 247)
Even so, I believe Parekh is a closet liberal. Liberals know that insisting on certain
universal values is sometimes the only recourse one has when faced with systematic
discrimination that continues to be countenanced by ‘culture’. Whatever its limita-
tions, Parekh’s theory offers us an inspiring example of how to approach seemingly
intractable issues. Its foremost strength lies in his call to dialogue and mutual
understanding. I agree with Parekh that only in dialogue should decisions be made
concerning whether certain cultural practices ought or ought not to be accommod-
ated. Parekh’s theory also gives philosophical substance to the case for well-being
in ways not narrowly defined by the criteria of liberals. The question remains,
however, whether in light of the many illiberal communities who spurn the
opportunity to learn from others, compromise, accommodation and a ‘broad and
inherently tentative consensus’ fostered by dialogue and reciprocal gestures will
ever thrive.
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Notes
1. Parekh does not analytically distinguish culture from religion, arguing instead that
‘[r]eligion shapes a culture’s system of beliefs and practices, [meaning that] culture
influences how a religion is interpreted’. B. Parekh (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism:
Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 147.
2. Cultures are continually in the process of redefinition and reconstitution, though it is
important to emphasize that cultural change—and the individual changes that occur
with them—do not all occur at once or at the same speed. Some take place rather rapidly
while others develop slowly and over a lifetime. Just as cultures are reconstituted, so too
individual responses to culture self-modify and shift. Only where cultural changes occur
too quickly or extensively to be absorbed by its members is there likely to be a crisis.
This crisis may take the form of moral panic, reactionary resistance (often leading to
fundamentalism of different sorts), and possibly profound individual conflict.
3. He does concede, however, that persons are not entirely bereft of certain ‘species-
derived capacities,’ by which he means ineliminable, independent resources and critical
faculties.
4. See W. Kymlicka (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
(Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 171. Parekh disagrees with Kymlicka, correctly I
think, on whether the distinction between national minorities and immigrant minorities
matters so much (leading Kymlicka to argue that immigrants must assimilate as best
they can), especially in light of Kymlicka’s contention that culture is central to a person’s
well being. See B. Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, op. cit., p. 103.
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5. Cf. W. Kymlicka (1989) Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University
Press), p. 176.
6. Parekh prefers the liberalism of Joseph Raz on this point for his allowing well being a
broader definition, not inextricably linked to autonomy. See J. Raz (1994) Ethics in the
Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University
Press), pp. 155–176.
7. G. David, & K. K. Ayouby (2002) Being Arab and Becoming Americanized: Forms of
mediated assimilation in metropolitan Detroit, in: Y. Y. Haddad & J. I. Smith (eds),
Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and invisible (Walnut Creek, CA, AltaMira), p. 140.
8. B. Parekh, op. cit., p. 251.
9. See J. Rawls (1993) Political Liberalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), passim.
10. Parekh speaks admiringly of Habermas inasmuch as he calls upon twenty-first century
citizens to look beyond strictly national identities to constitutional principles, but does
not approve of Habermas’ overly rational approach that takes no account of one’s
cultural or religious identity. See J. Habermas (1996) The European Nation-State: Its
achievements and its limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, in:
G. Barakrishnan (ed.), Mapping the Nation, pp. 281–294.
11. The phrase is Michael Sandel’s, an important influence on Parekh’s thinking. See
M. Sandel (1984) The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory,
12:1, pp. 81–96.
12. This type of argument takes the form of showing parallels between one society and
another. Thus to the question of bodily mutilation, Parekh draws attention to the fact
that Western societies celebrate body piercing, tattoos and all kinds of cosmetic surgery
(e.g. breast augmentation), much of which is extremely painful. Of course this does not
speak to the problems of making analogous arguments, for instance whether such
decisions to undergo willful disfigurement are free and rational.
13. This is the case, for instance, with the practice of ritual slaughter. Controversies have
erupted throughout Europe over the Muslim practice of killing a fully conscious animal
by slitting its throat. Most countries require that the animal be stunned first, but the
controversy has not abated because religious purists invoke the ‘religious duty’
requirement. Parekh rides the fence here, and says that ‘the pain lasting barely a few
seconds should not be given greater moral weight than the cultural sentiments of the
two communities’. He also adds that popular sensitivity to the rights of animals has not
yet reached a point of intensity that we ought to consider the practice as morally offensive
or disagreeable. He does, however, cite the case of Norway, where compromises have
been made to suit the needs of the Norwegian government, popular sentiment, and
the cultural requests of the Jewish and Muslim communities. See B. Parekh, op. cit.,
p. 274.
14. In the United States, this is the logic behind the legislation of Title IX, American
disabilities and affirmative action, all of which have been enacted to combat ways in
which ‘equality of opportunity’ has played out in the United States. Positive forms of
discrimination are justified repeatedly as a means of rectifying past injustices and
furthering the aims of integration and equality.
15. Yet in the UK, acknowledging the additional responsibility incurred by those who insist
on wearing turbans, Sikhs have reached a compromise with British officials and have
agreed to assume a more personal responsibility on the occasion of injury. See Parekh’s
discussion, B. Parekh, op. cit., p. 243–249.
16. The expression is Rawlsian, I am aware, and there is much exception taken to it.
Nevertheless, I use it here to describe a liberal aim that Parekh also appeals to without
using this language. It is for this reason that I ultimately find Parekh to be a liberal.
17. One might cynically note that Parekh’s proposals would likely discredit religion, but
Parekh’s culturally sensitive approach would disallow it. Moreover, there is too much
good to any religious tradition to dismiss the entire religion. Parekh merely calls for 1)
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a discrediting of certain harmful cultural practices that enjoy the sanction of religion,
and 2) the possibility for religious persons to appeal to their deepest convictions to
buttress their claims in the public sphere.
18. Hence, those definitions that bring certain harm to a community’s members ought not
to be allowed.
19. This is precisely the case for lesbian Muslims, who are usually forced to either deny
their sexual identities in order to conform to Islam, or abandon Islam in order to be
true to their sexual identities. Very few (though there are some) attempt to wed the two
seemingly irreconcilable cultures (one gay and the other ethnic/religious) together. The
discussion took place on the PBS monthly magazine, In the Life, October 7, 2003.
20. This is exactly the theme taken up in O’Donnel’s 2000 film, East is East.
21. This is made vividly manifest in the 2002 documentary film Devil’s Playground, an
intimate look at Amish teenagers who must choose during a rite of passage, referred to
as Rumspringa, whether to remain within the community and be baptized members of
the church. More than 10% decides to leave each year, never to return.
22. One’s liberal status usually remains in tact when two criteria have been established:
a) the theorist is ultimately concerned with the well being of individuals, and b) some
authentic possibility of exiting the community into which one is born is provided.
23. Callan famously expounds this view, but already we find in Lomasky that servility is a
vice.
24. See G. Snik & J. de Jong (1995) Liberalism and Denominational Schools, Journal of
Moral Education, 24, pp. 395–407; Cf. Callan (1997a) op. cit., p. 181. For a nice
summary of these various attempts, see N. Burtonwood (2002) Political Philosophy and
Lessons for Faith-based Schools, Educational Studies, 28:3, pp. 239–252.
25. The incident, recently carried in Dutch daily newspaper, describes the contents from a
book, published by an Amsterdam mosque, in which an imam called for the death of
homosexuals by throwing them off buildings headfirst. The Dutch government correctly
sees this as beyond the limits of justifiable freedom and tolerance. See ‘Gooi homo’s van
hoge gebouwen,’ De Volkskrant (April 18, 2004).
26. This becomes obvious once one considers the very different outcomes of intercultural
evaluation on various controversial cultural practices. Parekh walks us through several
examples, but passes over the difficulty of adapted choices too quickly and fails to
appreciate the potential violation of free will to the same degree in, say, arranged
marriage that he does in the case of polygamy.
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